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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN 1910.¹

IF one studies the principal movements of German philosophy in recent years, one will find that in 1910 the development has been continued along the previous course. It is true that in philosophy more than in any other field the temporal succession coincides with the logical order. We recognize thus that during the past year the same characteristic motives and internal conflict have been at work. On the one hand, there is philosophical *analysis*, which in epistemology and logic brings about an ever finer sifting and separating of the various elements of thinking, a movement embodying the principle of limitation and differentiation. On the other hand, there are attempts,—they are not yet much more than attempts,—at a new metaphysical *synthesis* of all existence. The fundamental deficiency of contemporary philosophy lies just in the fact that these two functions, the analytical and the synthetical, from whose union and interpenetration alone a great *Weltanschauung* can arise, do not co-operate, but pursue their aims each for itself and independent of the other. Analysis, which in its progress of making subtle distinctions has accomplished astonishing results, is in danger of losing its positive contents and of degenerating into mere play with definitions; while synthesis, on the contrary, is still in need of critical formulation and so fails to present its results in finished form and with the power of conviction. Nevertheless, the era of Critical Idealism from Kant to Hegel, which still has the strongest influence upon present German philosophy, is best fitted to exemplify this union of the two modes of reflection. The

¹ Translated from the German by Dr. L. R. Geissler.

continually growing importance which Hegel, the great dialectician and systematizer, has gained in modern epistemology and logic as well as in metaphysics, is perhaps a favorable sign that the two fundamental forces of philosophical thought begin to converge toward a point of intimate reunion.

Although the most recent German philosophy has not given up its Kantian leaning, yet it cannot be denied that even those thinkers who once strictly maintained this attitude have begun to manifest a new striving beyond the limits of historical and neo-Kantian Criticism in one or the other of the two directions which I have indicated at an earlier date. It is either in the direction of logic or in that of metaphysics. The close connection which Transcendentalism has brought about between the laws of thought and the laws of being, which is the characteristic feature and the historical significance of this philosophy, is again being dissolved. The strict objectivity which Kant had sought in a conceptual, categorical penetration of the world of facts, of phenomena, is projected by some into the thought-act, by others into a metaphysical reality beyond the world of phenomena. This turn becomes especially clear in the work of the stricter Kantians, in so far as it extends into our times. A good opportunity to study this change is offered by the *Festheft der Kantstudien* in commemoration of Otto Liebmann's seventieth birthday. A number of well-known thinkers have united to do honor to the deserving scholar by a critical and profound presentation of the main points of his teachings. The introductory essay by Windelband is a general characterization of Liebmann, whom he calls the truest of all Kantians. In the latter's first writing, *Kant und die Epigonen*, he rejected the metaphysical elaborations of the *Vernunftkritik* as well as naïve materialism, and demanded a return to the master himself. This persistent loyalty finds expression more in his general mental attitude than in his positive conclusion. His method is the strict study of limitations: instead of having his problems end more or less dogmatically in a solution, he searches out their sources, tries to analyze their meaning, and finds in such analyses the measure or degree of possible solution. Although Liebmann has no sympathy with

relativism, yet his standpoint is anthropological, his concept of knowledge is limited to the specifically human forms of consciousness,—beyond this there exist mere suppositions, vague hypotheses, but no facts of knowledge.

Liebmann's various theories are presented with more detail in the following essays. His epistemology is described by Adickes, his conflict with empiricism by Hugo Falkenheim, his treatment of the relation of philosophy to mathematics by Walter Kinkel, his doctrine concerning the organism by Hans Driesch, his criticism of the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism by Richard Hönigswald, and his attitude toward Criticism and Nature-philosophy by Bruno Bauch, while Fritz Medicus writes on Liebmann as a poet.

A new and extensively planned work by Ernst Cassirer on *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*¹ belongs also to the thought-sphere of neo-Kantianism. It is divided into two parts, an investigation of the concepts of things and relations, and secondly, of the system of relational concepts and the problem of reality. Cassirer starts from formal logic, the realm that should be the profoundest basis of all knowledge and thought, and shows that this study,—and in particular its most important feature, the theory of the formation of concepts,—is no longer compatible with the principles of the scientific understanding of the world, although even Kant considered it still in the form laid down by Aristotle as ultimate truth. Mathematics, as well as the various branches of natural science, no longer fit into the schemata of this theory. Its fundamental error lies in the doctrine that concepts arise through *abstraction*, a dogma which originated in the Aristotelian metaphysics, but which is no longer adequate to the modern conception of the universe. The positive and productive method of forming concepts cannot be explained by a negative operation, the omission and *forgetting* of individual characteristics. The most vigorous activity of the intellect, as it manifests itself in conceptual thought, ought not to be reduced to an intellectual weakness, *viz.*, the inability to retain the singular, the particular.

¹ Verlag von Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1910, pp. vii, 459.

This theory is especially disproved by mathematical concepts, which do not arise from manifold sensory impressions, but from a constructive unity. Concerning purely empirical concepts, furthermore, it must be emphasized that their origin in a number of common impressions is possible only if this common feature has been ascertained by an act of identification. It is hence not merely a matter of compared and related contents, there is required also an *activity* of comparing and relating, a productive principle of the formation of concepts, which by no means must always be one of similarity and comparison. By reason of this principle the various aspects of the given are examined from different angles, and the resulting *series-formation* (*Reihenbildung*) is the way in which we arrive at concepts. "We do not select from the manifold before us certain abstract parts, but we secure for its members an unequivocal *relation* by unambiguous interrelationship, thinking them connected through an inherent law. The place of the genus-concept in the old logic is taken by the mathematical concept of function which is to be extended also to the study of natural sciences. The concept possesses no substantial, intrinsic content, it is merely a law of the combination and co-ordination of members of the series. As long as one believes that all definiteness is exhausted by constant characteristics, by things and their attributes, so long of course does every conceptual generalization signify a mutilation of the conceptual content. But the more the concept is, so to speak, freed from its concrete existential content, the sooner, on the other hand, will its peculiar functional effect become apparent. The fixed attributes are replaced by general rules which allow us to view at a glance a whole series of possible determinations." The concept is thus not a fixed content but the living process of thought itself.

On this basis Cassirer examines the order of the various concepts, of the series-formations in the system of sciences, both in mathematics and in the natural sciences. His philosophical concept of truth and reality is similarly characterized as being interpreted functionally rather than substantially. Cassirer is an anti-metaphysician; for him there exists nothing but a

sphere of completely determined experience. The neo-Kantian attempt to unite the positivistic view of the universe with Criticism is here pushed to its extreme. Knowing for him is exhausted by the logical co-ordination of the various empirical data, but it does not contain any reference to a trans-subjective, transcendent existence. There is in principle no opposition between subjective and objective, even if one includes the phenomena of hallucinations and dreams. There are only differences of degree in the whole of experience: one content possesses greater constancy for the whole system of experience than another. It is inherent in the nature of this consistent functionalism that it leads to a relativity of truth and reality, but a relativity of which Cassirer rightly holds that it has nothing to do with a physical dependence upon the individual thinking subjects. It is a logical dependence of the various parts and members of experience upon the whole of experience. Knowledge is thus not something definite and given once for all, it is rather an infinite movement whose ideal aim is the elimination of variable, and the substitution of constant elements in the functional coherence of the given. In this turn there is revealed not only the above noted relation to modern positivism, but also a beginning of the transition from the standpoint of the historical Kant to that of Fichte and Hegel, which we meet among many of the most recent thinkers.

Bruno Bauch's book on *Immanuel Kant*, which appeared in the Göschen Collection,¹ belongs also to the more strictly transcendental movement. It is an extremely clear and instructive presentation of the Kantian philosophy, which in its brevity and conciseness allows the main points of this doctrine to stand out clearly and tangibly. The author rightly takes especial pains to free the concept 'transcendental' from its usual misinterpretations, which would refer it either to a psychological or a metaphysical sphere, while in reality it is the most profound basis of experience. As such it cannot,—like any other principle of orientation,—be itself a part of this foundation: it cannot be itself empirical but must be given *a priori*. The historical and

¹Leipzig, pp. 207.

actual content of the critical philosophy is thus put in a truer light than in recent interpretations, which attempt to fuse somehow the transcendent with the transcendental. The relatively detailed presentation of the transcendental doctrine of knowledge, passing from the *Æsthetics* to the *Dialectics* and summarizing Kant's complicated train of thought with clearness and precision, is followed by two briefer chapters on the practical philosophy as well as on the *Æsthetics* and teleology. Although Bauch does not bind himself dogmatically to any standpoint, yet in general he is related to the Marburg school. One may say that the difficult task of reproducing such a differentiated and complicated system as the Kantian within a small space has received here a most happy solution. Another and larger work by the same author, *Das Substanzproblem in der griechischen Philosophie bis zur Blütezeit*,¹ rests on a similar methodical basis and attempts to present systematically the historical development of the concept of substance in ancient Greece. It deals with the history of the abstract concept of substance which, aside from the feature of constancy, possesses as yet no concrete content, whether material or psychical. If this concept of substance constantly varies in the historical development, there must be something common in all these variations which returns and which, so to speak, forms the substance of the concept. Bauch defines this element very precisely in the Introduction. The substance is the permanent *within* the change, not that which persists *at* the change. ("Die Substanz ist das *im* Wechsel Beharrliche, nicht das, was *beim* Wechsel beharrt.") Space, time, causality, identity do not belong to the substance, though they are the pre-suppositions of the change, but are not directly concerned with it. The substance is not the change but the changing, or really the basis of the changing persisting in the change. This sharp dialectical analysis of the concept of substance, which at the same time illuminates Bauch's peculiar midway position between experience and metaphysics, enables him to express more clearly than most of the previous presentations the finer logical nuances in the treatment of this problem by Greek philosophers. This

¹ Winter, Heidelberg, pp. ix, 265.

holds true especially in the opposition of Heraclitus to the Eleatics. Bauch shows that this opposition is not absolute, that even Heraclitus, the philosopher of flux, recognized and required a substance which he spiritualized in a peculiar way. The change or rather the principle underlying it, the logos, is, in distinction from the changing, the persistent substance. How far back the investigation goes is shown by the chapters on the beginnings of the formation of scientific and mathematical concepts. The discussion of the problem reaches its climax in the sections on Plato and Aristotle, and these sections are especially effective, because here the most important motives of the two great views of the world come into clear relief by reason of their being grouped around the central problem of substance. However differently these two greatest Greek philosophers have defined it, there is yet a common element in it, something that serves as an eternal prototype, namely, this: neither of the two define substance dogmatically as either matter or mind, neither project it entirely within or without the world of phenomena, but they find in it the real common borderland of the immanent and the metaphysical reality. They have thus attained that scientific and epistemological form of the concept of substance which was later taken over and further developed by Kant.

The transcendental logical standpoint is clearly worked out in an essay by Heinrich Rickert, entitled *Vom Begriff der Philosophie*, the first article in the new journal *Logos*, of which we shall say more later on. The study has some resemblance to the author's recent investigations *Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie* published in the last volume of the *Kantstudien*, as it continues their theme. Rickert attacks first the view, widely held, which perceives the starting point and stimulating moment of philosophical reflections in the splitting up of Being into objectivity and subjectivity, in the supplementation of the objectifying scientific methods by the expressions of the subjective, psychological, inner life. It is in general the rigid opposition of an external and an internal world which according to this point of view justifies philosophical investigations. This has some bearing on the contrasts of intellectualism and voluntarism, passivism and activism, determinism and

indeterminism, pantheism and theism, mechanism and teleology, dogmatism and criticism, empiricism and rationalism, naturalism and idealism. Over against this Rickert emphasizes the fact that the true boundary line does not run within existence, between the subjective and objective halves of reality, but between the total existence, whether subjective or objective, and that sphere which lies beyond all being, beyond all existence and reality, that is, the sphere of *values*. The value belongs as little to the subject as to the object; it is rather the measure for both. Only the visible substrates of the values, the *goods*, as well as the psychic *evaluations* are real, the former as objective, the latter as subjective phenomena. But they must not be confused with the intrinsic, timeless value. The chasm between value and reality must however be bridged somehow, the dualism must be dissolved into some synthetic unity. Rickert seeks it in the concept 'import' (Sinn), *i. e.*, in that intellectual relation of the subject to the values which disclose to him their internal nature. What is here called import is not exhausted in a psychic, temporally limited act, it is not absorbed in mental contents nor mental acts, but points beyond them to the realm of values. In a most remarkable discussion Rickert shows that in psychology and in metaphysics analysis of reality and interpretation of import are often confused. Again, import is not identical with value, merely because it points toward the value. Rickert finds thus the desired bond between value and reality in the fact that the individual, from within the realm of his psychic, experiential reality, by reaching beyond it can establish an intelligent relation to the eternal spiritual values. Such experiences are on the one hand psychic realities, on the other hand a transcendent value is revealed in them.

In his conception of the nature of value, and especially in extending his objectifying, non-evaluating (wertindifferent) method of observation uniformly over physical and psychical being, Rickert resembles in many respects Münsterberg, to whom he is also related in his methodological inclinations toward Fichte. But Rickert diverges from Fichte's metaphysical basis even farther than Münsterberg. Metaphysics seems to him a mere roundabout way taken by the idea of value, and hence a super-

fluous addition, for in reality all values have to be applied and related to the given world.

In view of this great significance which Fichte has gained in most recent years, the publication of a selection of his works in six volumes by Eckardt (Leipzig) is a welcome undertaking. In the past year the third and fifth volumes have appeared, which contain, among other writings, later editions of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, furthermore *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat*, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*, and *Die Bestimmung des Gelehrten*.

We have seen above in the case of Cassirer how the attempt of neo-Kantianism to pass from the objective to the functional, from the rigid substance of abstract thought to the vital activity of the concrete mind, involved necessarily Fichtean and Hegelian motives. It is undoubtedly true that Kant had fettered knowledge to definite, finished, logically irresolvable facts of objective and subjective contents. He had not passed either beyond the thing-in-itself, from which his *material* of knowledge was derived, or beyond the conception of the categories as natural *forms* of the thinking subject, into which his knowledge is moulded. However vigorously he strove beyond the contingency of actuality to the intrinsic validity of logical values, he yet encumbered these values with facts, and thus robbed them of their unconditional necessity. This last barrier could be removed only by a view in which the opposition of subject and object underlying knowledge was no longer absolute but merely relative, so that the contrast had to be deduced from knowledge in a logical manner, because such a view alone allowed the problem of knowledge to rest, not upon irrational facts, but upon rational laws of thought. The removal of this barrier was begun by Fichte and Schelling, who started with a psychical totality from which they tried to derive the ego and the non-ego, while Hegel brought this development to a conclusion by defining that totality as a strictly logical one which produces out of its immanent necessity the different moments, subjective and objective reality. Not even neo-Kantianism which, better than its creator, freed the main transcendental thought from metaphysical, realistic, and subjectivistic implications, was able to overcome a last remainder, which

had its origin in the principles of the Kantian doctrine, not merely in its defective historical form. According to Kant all knowledge consists in the fact that the sensory manifoldness is put into definite forms, the categories or synthetical principles. The sensory manifoldness, which as such is and remains irrational, and the unity of rational thought stand thus like strangers opposed to each other, like two mechanically separated things which are to be brought together again in a mechanical way, a method which Fichte had ridiculed as "*Formgebungsmanufaktur*." Indeed, the process of knowledge is too organic and unified not to provide for the distinction within it of form and matter, as abstract *moments* as well as real *parts*. Unity and manifoldness are correlative terms which have meaning only with reference to each other and must not be isolated. There is no absolute manifoldness outside of unity, and just as little is there unity which is not unity of a manifold. It is a naïve idea to suppose that on the one side time and space produced an infinite manifold, while on the other side thought brought forth the bond of unity; rather both are posited in the original thought-act through and for each other.

This step had already been taken by Cohen in his *Logik des reinen Erkennens*, where he had insisted upon the unitary development of all determinations from pure thought according to the logic of "origin." Recently Paul Natorp in his work *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaft* (Wissenschaft und Hypothese XII)¹ draws the same conclusion. The standpoint and different discussions of this work show certain similarities with that of Cassirer, although in the former the relation to Hegel is much more definite. Knowledge is not a sum total of closed suppositions, but an infinite process. "We can no longer speak of a given object." "The object is rather the *problem*, the task *ad infinitum*. And thus knowledge as directed to an object is of necessity a synthesis in Kant's sense, *i. e.*, augmentation, or continual progress." The creative, fundamental function of thought is therefore not analysis in the usual meaning, but synthesis; or rather, what is called analysis presupposes on its

¹ Teubner, Leipzig, pp. xx, 416.

side the original act of synthesis, for all analysis presupposes contradiction, and the proposition of contradiction has its positive form of expression in the principle of identity. This seems to be merely tautological, but in reality it is synthetical in as far as it deals with an identity which is at first thought of as different; and in all identity the difference and manifoldness is contained in it as a moment which is overcome or annulled, but which for that very reason must also be presupposed in it. Although this may strike at the deepest root of Kant's synthetic unity, yet this interpretation is historically not a true one, but points,—according to our earlier discussion,—toward the further development from Kant to Fichte and Hegel.

Upon this foundation Natorp erects the system of fundamental logical functions, beginning with the relation of judgment to concept. These must not be presupposed as existing, they must be deduced from the fundamental act of knowledge, the correlation of union and separation, which we meet in the principle of identity. In the same way the fundamental logical functions in their interrelation develop out of this fundamental act, and in their presentation Natorp follows somewhat loosely Kant's system of categories. The category of quality especially, which takes the place of the principle of the concept-formation, receives an extended transformation. This discussion excels in subtleness and logical precision, and the same is true of the further studies of number and calculation, whose results agree in many cases with those of Cassirer, of infinity and constancy, and of the nature of space and time.

The book concludes with a chapter on the spatial-temporal order of phenomena and the mathematical principles of science. The author discusses here the problems of absolute space and time, of mass, substance and energy, in accordance with the latest hypotheses of research. Natorp attempts,—as likewise Cassirer had tried to do,—to show that the principle of relativity of all existence does not lead to pure empiricism, but on the contrary, that it is quite compatible with critical, transcendental presuppositions. The essential difference from Cassirer seems to lie in a modification of the standpoint or the methodical

progress of the discussion: the universal functionalism which Natorp likewise substitutes for a substantial world-view, is developed by him more out of a single root, as the expression of a single process of thought which creates out of itself all categories. In this lies, as I have shown above, the historical relation to Hegel.

An essay by Julius Ebbinghaus on *Relativer und Absoluter Idealismus*¹ leads us into the midst of Hegelianism. It does not attempt to develop new contents of knowledge or to construct a new system of knowledge; it aims to throw light on the process of knowledge, on knowing as such. Knowledge does not mean, as abstract theories assume, that the individual grasps a foreign object lying outside of him, dressing it in his own forms, or approaching and assimilating it. Knowledge is not a relation between a finite ego and a finite non-ego; it is rather an infinite unitary totality which contains the ego and the non-ego as correlative moments. The subject is not the starting-point of knowing, for it is, like the object, something already known, from which the knowing itself is separated as an independent, absolute, intrinsic value.

The pamphlet gives evidence of penetration, clearness, and vigor of linguistic expression. And yet it is not quite possible to see how this exposition of the process of knowing, undertaken in Hegelian spirit, can lead to a concrete knowledge of the world by which one would be able to grasp the essence of the various contents of being.

Against this extreme movement which has found a number of gifted representatives among the younger generation, Windelband expresses himself in a lecture on *Die Erneuerung des Hegelianismus*.² He thinks it has only a relatively small justification. The perfect systematic form, the optimistic and universalistic features are the stimulating moments to which Hegel's philosophy owes its renewed power, not the dialectic method, which Windelband rejects. The lasting justification of Hegel's standpoint and the return to it are due to his use of the history of the world,

¹ Veith & Co., Leipzig, pp. 72.

² Winter, Heidelberg, pp. 15.

as a basis of orientation. While Kant, and still more his successor Fries, tried to derive the eternal value of reason from a psychological analysis of mental life, Hegel transferred his studies into the realm of world-historical events. "We take part in universal reason merely as historical beings belonging to a species in the process of development. History is therefore the true organ of philosophy, or to speak in Hegelian language: the objective spirit is the habitat of the absolute spirit. For this reason recent philosophy is about to return to the Hegelian method, which consists in deriving the principles of reason from the historical cosmos as it presents itself to experience in the science of civilization." The inner connection of these rational principles can be only partly reconstructed from the history of civilization, because we lack the organ of insight into its absolute completion and inner necessity. Windelband, who from principle holds strictly to the Kantian limits of knowledge, rejects the proposition of Hegel and the Hegelians, according to which we possess such an organ in the dialectical method.

A less close relation to Fichte and Hegel exists in the writings of Goswin Uphues, who, as I believe, is not fully appreciated. I will mention here only his three most recent publications, *Erkenntniskritische Logik* (pp. viii, 151), *Erkenntniskritische Psychologie* (pp. viii, 140), and *Geschichte der Philosophie als Erkenntniskritik* (pp. xiii, 174).¹ Uphues, who is a strict anti-psychologist, directs transcendental reflection more into metaphysical, Platonic spheres. Object of knowledge is for him that which is absolutely necessary, which cannot be otherwise. The logical laws, even those of the so-called formal logic, are not merely laws of thought but laws of being. It is in the nature of truth to be non-temporal, not only as regards conceptual judgments, *i. e.*, those of mathematics, which deal with matters that are valid without reference to time, but also in the case of factual judgments, *i. e.*, the judgments of empirical life which treat of things that come and go in time. The fact itself is temporally conditioned; but the judgment that this fact occurs now, that it is temporally conditioned, this judgment is non-temporal. The contents of conceptual

¹ All three are published by Max Niemeyer, Halle.

judgments are extra-temporal, the contents of factual judgments are intra-temporal; nevertheless, if it is a real fact it is also non-temporal. The metaphysical turn in Uphues consists in the fact that he refers truth back to a *transcendent* basis, a divine consciousness, instead of allowing it to rest in itself, as pure logic does. The conceptual judgments which express the nature of a thing are founded on the notion that they are *thought* by God, while the factual judgments which signify the existence of a thing rest on the notion that they are *willed* by Him.

A metaphysical, if not a logical and epistemological, reference to the post-Kantian philosophy of identity, especially to Schelling and Hegel, is evident in the works of Eduard v. Hartmann. His doctrine of the Unconscious reminds one of Schelling, while the closed architectonic structure of his system, which may indeed be called the last philosophical system, resembles Hegel. This system is not so much to be found in his chief works as in his posthumous publication *System der Philosophie im Grundriss*.¹ Even the external structure of this undertaking, which is planned on a large basis, does full justice to the systematic point of view. The work is divided into eight volumes which have appeared one after another in the course of the last few years, so that the whole system lies now before us completed, giving us a far vision into the world of thoughts of its creator. The first volume is entitled *Grundriss der Erkenntnislehre*, and in it the methods and aims of philosophical reflection are analyzed. The object of knowledge, if we begin with the world of phenomena, is the dualism of the physical and the psychical, of the material world and the mental life. This leads up in the second volume to a *Grundriss der Naturphilosophie*, and in the third volume to a *Grundriss der Psychologie*. The question of a common root of the physical and the mental, the problem of the absolute nature of the world, results in the fourth volume in a *Grundriss der Metaphysik*. Since the Absolute must be determined not only in its content but also in its value, the next volume is a *Grundriss der Axiologie oder Wertlehre*. In the remaining three volumes on Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, and Æsthetics, the relation of man to the Absolute receive special treatment.

¹ Published, as are the previous works, by Haacke, Bad Sachsa im Harz.

In his epistemology Hartmann calls himself a transcendental realist. While naïve realism confuses the world of consciousness with the real world, and the transcendental idealist denies a reality outside of consciousness, transcendental realism distinguishes between the real world and the world of consciousness which is simply an image of it. Hartmann assumes that sensory qualities are only subjective, but that the forms of time and space are also forms of the things-in-themselves, outside of consciousness. The method of this metaphysics, strangely enough, is not supposed to be deductive or dialectical, but inductive. The induction, however, does not lead from one phenomenon to another, but from experience to metaphysical hypotheses. It is not immanent like positivism, it is transcendent. Yet it lies in the nature of all inductive reflection that it leads only to hypotheses and probabilities and not to apodictic, absolute truth. Nevertheless, Hartmann rejects all higher metaphysical claims, as they overstep the limits of knowledge. He thus constructs a series of hypotheses concerning the realm of the things-in-themselves. As a philosopher of nature he accepts dynamism, not materialism. A complex of unconsciously acting forces underlie the external corporeal phenomena, not mere inert matter, which in passive existence fills the space. He calls this doctrine an atomistic dynamism. Similarly, all activity and synthesis in mental life points toward a creative Unconsciousness whose reflection only appears in our consciousness which is nothing but a constant flux of images. The common root of nature and mind lies in the Unconscious which Hartmann defines again in a dual way, as something dynamical and also logical, *i. e.*, as will and as idea. The tendency to combine Schopenhauer and Hegel, which is found among many modern thinkers, *e. g.*, in Nietzsche and in Wundt, is very markedly embodied in Hartmann. Consequently, he is not an absolute pessimist like Schopenhauer. In so far as a logical idea reigns in this world, it fulfils rational purposes. Teleologically considered, that is, with reference to the *criterion of purpose*, Hartmann calls himself even an optimist; from the point of eudemonology, that is, with reference to the *criterion of pleasure*, he is a pessimist. Both points of view are

combined in such a way into a doctrine of redemption as to recognize the evolutionary principle, the rise of mankind to higher stages of development, and yet to find the real goal of development in the supreme dispersion of all illusions and in the ultimate absorption of the world-process through the Absolute.

Another group of thinkers are less interested in the doctrine of the categories than in the phenomenology of knowing, and follow therefore not so much the philosophers and metaphysicians of identity as men like Fries, Bolzano, and lately also Wolff, all of them with more of a metaphysical turn of mind. To this group belong Husserl, Marty, Meinong, Nelson, Pichler, and others. As in most movements so here, one cannot draw fast lines of distinction, and yet one may say that these men transfer the center of their investigations from the content of knowledge to the function of knowing. In this connection two valuable historical works must be mentioned which have appeared this year: Hugo Bergmann's book *Das philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzano's*¹ and Hans Pichler's study *Ueber Christian Wolff's Ontologie*.² Considering the great influence which Bolzano's work has exerted on a wide range of modern epistemology, Bergmann's presentation of this philosophy is certainly of more than historic-literary significance. Pure logistic (Logismus), as its renovator Husserl has pointed out, finds its real origin in Bolzano. Bergmann gives a complete and carefully worked out summary of this peculiar philosophy, which with all its subtle analyses is not always free from trivialities in its results. Its methodical and logical aspects are most valuable: less fertile is it for psychology, ethics, æsthetics, and metaphysics. In the appendix Bolzano's contributions to a philosophical foundation of mathematics are considered. The most interesting part is undoubtedly the doctrine of the propositions-in-themselves, which form an anticipation of the modern anti-psychologistic position. The proposition-in-itself (Satz an sich) is the unitary logical meaning of a statement, as contrasted with the wavering, changing ways of their psychological representations. It signifies the

¹ Max Niemeyer, Halle a. Saale, pp. xiv, 230.

² Dürr, Leipzig, pp. 91.

inner import of a thought, which is independent of its process of being thought. Bolzano, strangely enough, extends this objectivity of the propositions-in-themselves to true and false judgments alike, which is rejected by Bergmann, because he sees in it merely a criterion of truth. On the whole Bolzano in his epistemology and metaphysics stands close to Leibniz, to whom in the last analysis Bolzano's followers, the exponents of logistic as well as those of the theory-of-objects (*Gegenstandstheorie*), are related, as opposed to the neo-Kantians and neo-Hegelians. In this connection the philosophy of Christian Wolff, Leibniz' truest disciple, which had long been believed to be forgotten beyond recall, has been restored to new life. Pichler, in his above mentioned monograph, honors him as the real founder of the theory-of-objects which we usually connect with Meinong's name. Although Wolff calls it ontology, it is not merely a doctrine of being or existence, because it refers to all kinds of objects in general, independent of the question whether they exist or not, for example, even to the objects of mathematics to which directly no existence can be attributed. Existence is not an essential property of objects, and the ontology is thus a "*daseins-freie*" reflection. Wolff develops the axiomata of ontology, especially the proposition of contradiction, which is not a subjective law of thought in the sense of formal logic, but the most general law of all objects. Wolff's attempt to deduce from this axiomatic proposition the proposition of cause is untenable.

Pichler tries to see in Kant's transcendental logic nothing more than the sketch of an ontology in the old sense, as he in general endeavors to lower Kant's originality and to find in his *Kritik* a mere bent in the subjective and psychological direction. Although it is of course impossible thus to exhaust the motives of the Kantian philosophy, it is nevertheless of interest to find that its connection with Leibniz and Wolff is closer than the history of philosophy usually assumes. In general, it looks as if the further development of philosophical reflection will gain a new anchorage in the relations of similarity and contrast which exist between Kant and Leibniz.

The compass of epistemology is too narrow to include all sorts of philosophical publications. In the various sciences, in the arts, in the personal and social life, the desire grows more and more intense to pass out of the realm of facts, from their isolation and diversity directly to the totality of a *Weltanschauung*. This desire underlies modern neo-romanticism with its leaning to metaphysics, which at present finds its strongest guide in Bergson, whose influence is rapidly growing. His principle of intuition is doubtless a romantic one with a close resemblance to Schelling's views. Whatever attitude one may take toward it, certainly one must admit that abstract, analytical understanding is not the organ by means of which one can penetrate into the innermost depths of the world-process. For the purpose of gaining a metaphysical view of the world the following alternative arises: either to give up logical thinking and to return to the standpoint of non-reflective intuition, or to seek beyond rigid, abstract analyses a still higher form of thinking which can take up into itself the richness of concrete experience and adapt itself to its rhythm. This elasticity of thought, which in great philosophers does not remain in cold and distant contrast to intuition, but rather organically unites with it, has received a beautiful description in Georg Simmel's little book *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie*.¹ He is not so much interested in the completed, so to speak, crystallized philosophical results and their mutual relations, as in the spiritual movement of reflection which leads to them, in the process of crystallization itself. He examines thus the fundamental motives of philosophical understanding of the world, namely, the contrast between the mystic and the transcendental reflections on being, the dialectic movement of the conceptual contrast between being and becoming, the ambiguous relation of subject and object, and finally the nature of ideal postulates and their connection with reality.

From another point of view Friedrich Jodl, in his extremely stimulating work *Aus der Werkstatt der Philosophie*,² undertakes to analyze that peculiar, in its last depths mysterious, mental

¹ Göschen, Leipzig, pp. 175.

² Hugo Heller, Wien, pp. 31.

impetus from which philosophical creations arise. He distinguishes between the merely scholarly technical work and the intuitive creative philosophy which permits us to see the whole universe in a new light. "The grinding of optical lenses,—the work by means of which poor Spinoza supported himself,—is a symbol of the activity of the philosopher in general, that is, of the kind of philosopher whom I have in mind. All philosophers grind lenses, artful glasses through which to take a view of the whole world, glasses which color this view in different ways, now illuminating, now obscuring it, glasses which will bring to an astonishingly clear focus many things that otherwise remain invisible to the unspectacled eyes, glasses through which again one does not notice other things that to the layman's eye seem necessary and essential parts of the world, glasses through which much is seen in quite different forms, order, and connection, glasses, finally, which sometimes distort the view of the world of everyday life to a degree of unrecognizableness." In every philosophical system there is furthermore an empirical moment which depends upon the historical conditions, the specific origin of the particular system. There is also to be added as a further presupposition the individual's power of independent development, of forming new postulates and new thought-possibilities. "Every original philosophy, especially its principle, its fundamental idea on the basis of which it reconstructs the world in thought, involves a discovery." Of course it is not a discovery of sensory facts, but of methods, of principles of order in the universe. The tragedy of philosophy consists in the fact that every great thinker claims to possess the ultimate eternal truth. There is one solution of this tragic conflict: although the great conceptions of the world do not exhaust the nature of truth itself, yet they are eternal elements in it; their manifoldness and mutual oppositions merely reflect the manifoldness and contrasts inherent in the object which they try to understand, namely the universe.

An unfailing symptom of the increasing tendency of our time to collect the manifoldness of our internal and external experiences into the unity of a world-conception is manifested in the under-

taking to give to these attempts an external meeting-point. This is the purpose of the journal *Logos*, an international periodical for philosophy of culture, which was recently founded. It is edited by Georg Mehlis in Freiburg i. B., with the co-operation of the most well-known scholars, as Eucken, Gierke, Husserl, Meinecke, Rickert, Simmel, Tröltsch, Weber, Wölfflin, and Windelband. The philosophical penetration of the most various realms of culture, of sciences, of art, of social-ethical, legal, national, and religious life is intended to prepare the formation of a unitary, philosophical system. For this reason the journal does not dogmatically bind itself from the start to a fixed program. It lays down only one presupposition, that all its co-operators are filled with the consciousness of culture, *i. e.*, with the idea that culture is not an isolated temporal phenomenon, but the revelation of an eternal universal rationality. "Without the belief in some logos inside or outside of life, a philosophy worthy of this name is altogether impossible." The journal is managed by an international committee which is divided into national editorships. The *Logos* has thus far published a number of interesting contributions by renowned authors. Besides the essay by Rickert already mentioned, we find studies by Emile Boutroux, Simmel, Benedetto Croce, Leopold Ziegler, Kroner, and others.

It is hoped that the external success will correspond to the internal value of the undertaking which is based upon its cultural tendency and which after the first samples is no longer to be doubted. Concentration upon a broad basis of discussion is especially to be desired at the present time, when so many productive forces are active, whose difference of standpoints is a hindrance to a fertile co-operation.

The same striving after a philosophical penetration of culture which has been the guiding principle of *Logos* has concentrated itself in another work with the significant title *Weltanschauung*.¹ It discusses in different articles by wellknown scholars the problems of philosophy and religion. Twenty authors, among whom are Dilthey, Joël, Wiesner, Driesch, Adickes, Natorp, Simmel,

¹Reichl & Co., Berlin, pp. xxii, 484.

Deussen, and Tröltsch, have joined forces,—in order to study the eternal values of the present mental life, which are based upon a higher reality dwelling above the changing interests of the time,—so that they might co-operate in the formation of an unitary world-conception. With due differentiation of all stand-points this conception is to find its unity in rigidly opposing every kind of positivism, whether based upon natural science or upon empirical psychology, by establishing the inadequacy of a mere study of facts as an ultimate universal method, in seeking the ultimate and Absolute not in finite, transitory phenomena but in the infinite, eternal values surrounding and penetrating the former, and in finding the springs of a higher metaphysical and religious life wherever man strives beyond mechanical necessities of being and thinking to cultural communities.

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